5G represents a revolution in mobile technology with performance that will rival that of wireline networks. 5G’s Ultra-reliable Low Latency Communication (uRLLC) links will enable a profusion of artificial intelligence (AI)-powered IoT devices from delivery drones to smart cities. The rapid rise in the number of smart IoT devices, coupled with expanded connectivity, will greatly escalate the growth of data and network traffic.
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Securing our IoT future
The holiday season brought with it a surge of new IoT devices, from smart toys and doorbells to automatic pet feeders – and it doesn’t stop there. According to IDC, investment in IoT is predicted to top $1 trillion in 2020. As our homes, businesses and cities become more connected than ever before, this number will only continue to rise. However, whilst the desire and demand for all-things IoT has taken centre-stage, it presents numerous challenges to security. If we want the connected age deliver on its promised benefits, security must take front and centre.
California’s IoT Law Is A Good Start, But More Needs To Be Done
Passed by former California governor Jerry Brown, cybersecurity law SB-327 went into effect on Jan. 1. This proactive legislation requires manufacturers to equip IoT devices with “reasonable” security features to prevent unauthorized access, modification and data leaks. Specifically, SB-327 requires manufacturers to implement a unique preprogrammed (default) password for each device. Additionally, manufacturers must ensure that users create a new password the first time a device is activated. Together, these steps are expected to help protect California consumers, as hackers are known to routinely target vulnerable devices shipped with generic or default login credentials.
California’s IoT law is a good start, but more needs to be done
Written by Paul Karazuba, head of product, Rambus Security
Passed by former California governor Jerry Brown, cybersecurity law SB-327 is slated to go into effect on January 1, 2020. This proactive legislation requires manufacturers to equip IoT devices with “reasonable” security features to prevent unauthorized access, modification and data leaks. Specifically, SB-327 requires manufacturers to implement a unique preprogrammed (default) password for each device. Additionally, manufacturers must ensure that users create a new password the first time a device is activated. Together, these steps are expected to help protect California consumers, as hackers are known to routinely target vulnerable devices shipped with generic or default login credentials.
From our perspective, SB-327 is clearly long overdue. Indeed, unprotected IoT devices continue to pose a threat to both consumer privacy and security across the country. For example, a Ring camera installed in the Memphis bedroom of a young girl was recently hijacked by a hacker who seized control of the device to spy on the 8-year-old, taunt her with music and encourage destructive behavior. Another instance of a Ring camera falling victim to a hacker was reported in December by a Houston family who heard an eerily disembodied voice ask if “anyone [was] home” and promised it was “gonna find out.”
According to various reports, the recent spate of Ring hacks likely involved basic attack techniques such as credential stuffing. This simple process involves accessing accounts with stolen account credentials and large-scale automated login requests. Consequently, Ring users who don’t enable the optional two-step authentication skip setting a unique password or recycle credentials across multiple online services, and are at a greater risk of being hacked. To be sure, malicious hackers have coded dedicated software for breaking into Ring security cameras. Beyond Ring cameras, a wide range of vulnerable consumer IoT devices are frequently targeted by hackers who actively search for devices with default or weak login credentials such as “admin” usernames and “1234” passwords.
Although SB-327 sets an important precedent by requiring a unique preprogrammed (default) password for each IoT device, we believe much more needs to be done to secure connected devices. Security starts at the hardware level, and it should begin on day one of product design. Device designers need to prioritize security as a primary design goal of a connected device; not an afterthought, and certainly not lip service. A solid start to security is basing the foundation of your security in silicon; specifically, a siloed security co-processor capable of executing all security-centric processes completely independently of the main CPU.
Our CryptoManager Root of Trust is an ideal implementation. While located on the same chip as the main CPU, its physical separation and 7 layers of hardware security ensure that secure processes remain exactly that – secure. The root of trust can better help protect consumers by enabling robust remote access authentication and monitoring of anomalous system activity. This siloed approach to security ensures that a potential compromise of the main processor does not expose critical keys and credentials – or impair the execution of security applications that monitor system operation and detect tampering.
Cybersecurity law SB-327 is a good start for California consumers, although far more needs to be done to comprehensively protect IoT devices. Implementing a unique preprogrammed (default) password for each device and requiring users to create a new password can help prevent basic attacks, although a siloed security co-processor is necessary to thwart determined adversaries and complex hacking techniques.
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California’s IoT Law Is A Good Start, But More Needs To Be Done
Rambus’ Ben Levine talks IoT security and cryptography with EDA Café
Ben Levine, Senior Director of Product Marketing at Rambus, recently sat down with Sanjay Gangal of EDA Café to discuss IoT security and cryptography. According to Levine, security should be embedded in every chip. More specifically, says Levine, a separate hardware-based security core can help protect both the SoC itself and the system it powers.
“This is particularly important for connected devices,” Levine explains. “Everything is connected to the internet these days – and every device is now exposed to wide range of threats and attackers. So you need really strong security. Devices have also become more complex and challenging to secure.”
Silicon Complexity and Security
The relationship between silicon complexity and security, says Levine, came to the fore with the advent of Meltdown and Spectre in 2018. As we’ve previously discussed on Rambus Press, Meltdown and Spectre were independently disclosed by a number of security experts, including senior Rambus technology advisor Paul Kocher and senior Rambus security engineer Mike Hamburg.
“Modern CPUs are incredibly complex. They are designed to be power efficient and high performance, but not necessarily secure,” Levine elaborates. “Security vulnerabilities happen when components interact in ways designers never thought about. As the number of components and complexity increases, so do interactions and potential security vulnerabilities.”
System designers, says Levine, have to get everything right, although an attacker only needs a single vulnerability to succeed.
“The solution we think makes the most sense is partitioning or siloing security away from other parts of an application that don’t necessarily need to be secure,” he states. “Keys, passwords, identifiers, security, and communications protocols; all of these need to be in a secure domain [secure core]. This domain can be optimized for security and kept relatively simple and straightforward.”
Rambus CryptoManager Root of Trust (CMRT) RT630
The advantage of secure cores, says Levine, is that they can be specifically designed from the ground up to provide robust security. To illustrate an example of a secure core, Levine highlights the Rambus CryptoManager Root of Trust (CMRT) RT630. Built around a custom RISC-V CPU, the CMRT RT630 is at the forefront of a new category of programmable hardware-based security cores.
As Levine explains, the CMRT RT630 is siloed from the primary processor so it can securely run sensitive codes, processes, and algorithms. Moreover, the CMRT provides the primary processor with a full suite of security services, such as secure boot and runtime integrity, remote attestation, and broad crypto acceleration for symmetric and asymmetric algorithms.
The CMRT also helps protect systems against test and debug interface attacks, Power/EM analysis (SPA/DPA), and other side-channel attacks, including timing attacks. Last, but certainly not least, the CMRT supports multiple roots of trust, with hardware ensuring isolation of resources, keys, and security assets. Each entity – such as a chip vendor, OEM or service provider – has access to its own virtual security core and performs secure functions without having to trust other entities.
AI & Quantum Computing
Levine also touches on security threats targeting artificial intelligence (AI) silicon, noting that there were quite a number of AI accelerators in the data center and at the edge. In addition, Levine discusses some of the real-world security risks associated with quantum computing.
“Quantum computing offers a lot of promise. However, asymmetric and symmetric cryptographic algorithms are designed to be secure. Guessing a random key for an AES encryption algorithm [using a conventional computer] would take you [forever],” he elaborates. “However, a quantum computer doesn’t work the same way as [today’s] computers. Asymmetric and symmetric encryption is vulnerable to quantum computing. IBM has said [current] algorithms won’t be secure against quantum computing.”
Rambus, says Levine, has been active in creating a new generation of algorithms that won’t be vulnerable to quantum computing and has submitted its work to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
View Ben Levine’s full video interview with Sanjay Gangal of EDA Café
Go here for our primer on hardware roots of trust
Silex malware bricks unprotected IoT devices
Earlier this summer, a new strain of destructive malware known as Silex began to spread and effectively brick IoT devices. As ZDNet’s Catalin Cimpanu reports, Silex victims can resurrect their devices by manually reinstalling firmware. However, most device owners typically consider the re-installation process to be overly complicated and time consuming.
“Silex works by trashing an IoT device’s storage, dropping firewall rules, removing the network configuration, and then halting the device,” writes Cimpanu. “It’s as destructive as it can get without actually frying the IoT device’s circuits. It’s expected that some owners will most likely throw devices away, thinking they’ve had a hardware failure without knowing that they’ve been hit by malware.”
Akamai researcher Larry Cashdollar, who first identified the malware in late June, tells ZDNet that Silex exploits known default credentials for IoT devices to log in and kill the system. More specifically, the malware strain writes random data from /dev/random to any mounted storage it finds. Subsequently, Silex deletes network configurations, runs rm -rf / to delete any remaining data, flushes all iptables entries, and adds an entry todrop all connections.
Ben Levine, a Senior Director of Security Product Managementat Rambus, tells Rambus Press that Silex is one of multiple malware strains that actively seeks out devices with default or weak login credentials such as “admin” usernames and “1234” passwords.
“Essentially, Silex exploits unprotected system functions to brick IoT devices,” he explains. “However, it is important to understand that a hardware-based root of trust can help protect against malware like Silex by ensuring robust remote access authentication and monitoring anomalous system operation.”
A hardware-based root of trust, says Levine, can be implemented as an independent security co-processor that is integrated into IoT devices. Put simply, a hardware-based root of trust allows execution of security applications, provides tamper detection and protection, and enables secure storage and handling of keys and security assets.
“An independent hardware-based root of trust offers chipmakers a siloed approach to security. Although it is typically placed on the same silicon as the main processor, the secure processing core is physically separated,” Levine elaborates. “This means that compromise of the main processor does not expose critical keys and credentials – or impair the execution of security applications that can monitor system operation and detect tampering. The root of trust can continue to provide security functionality – even if the attacker gains access to the device.”
A hardware-based root of trust can also implement strong authentication for remote access to a device, avoiding reliance on simple credentials that are often left in a default state.
“A hardware-based root of trust can be used to provide secure and flexible control over who and what can access a device. Different entities can be given different amounts of access based on how much they are trusted, and all of this can be enforced in hardware,” he concludes.
