At Rambus, we create cutting-edge semiconductor and IP products, spanning memory and interfaces to security, smart sensors and lighting.
The AES-IP-39 (EIP-39) is IP for accelerating the AES symmetric cipher algorithm (FIPS-197), supporting all NIST modes including ECB, CBC, CTR, CFB, OFB, CCM, GCM, CBC-MAC, CMAC, XTS, F8, F9 modes of operation up to 6.4 Gbps @ 1GHz. Designed for fast integration, low gate count and full transforms, the AES-IP-39 accelerator provides a reliable and cost-effective embedded IP solution that is easy to integrate into security modules needing versatile crypto.
AES family of accelerators, all modes.
Optional counter measures against side channel attacks and fault injection attacks.
Library element for VaultIP platform security engine.
The AES-IP-39 is a family of the cryptographic library elements in the Rambus hardware IP library (formerly of Inside Secure). For example, the lightweight configuration of the AES-IP-39 is the cipher core embedded in all Vault-IP platform security engines as well as the Crypto-IP-120 DMA crypto core. The accelerators include I/O registers, encryption and decryption cores, and the logic for feedback modes and key scheduling.
Sustained performance for any object sizes ranges from 1 to 6.4 Gbps depending on the configuration and area. Gate count is between 27K and 45K gates depending on the configuration.
The AES-IP-39 can be provided with counter measures including ones against side-channel attacks and fault injection attacks.
The design of chip anti-tamper protection needs to adapt and scale with rising threats. Adversaries range from high school hackers to well-funded state actors. Given the threats, it’s useful to think about anti-tamper countermeasures as a hierarchy of safeguards that parallel the type, effort and expense of attacks. Watch this webinar to learn the eleven kinds of tampering attacks and their required skills and resources, and countermeasures for each of these attacks.
Side-channel attacks conducted against electronic gear are relatively simple and inexpensive to execute. Such attacks include simple power analysis (SPA) and Differential Power Analysis (DPA). As all physical electronic systems routinely leak information, effective side-channel countermeasures should be implemented at the design stage to ensure protection of sensitive keys and data.