The MACsec, IPsec and SSL/TLS/DTLS protocols are the primary means of securing data in motion (communicated between connected devices). These protocols can be anchored in hardware or implemented in software as part of an end-to-end security architecture. This white paper provides fundamental information on each of these protocols including their interrelationships and use cases.
Dedicated accelerator hardware for artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) algorithms are increasingly prevalent in data centers and endpoint devices. These accelerators handle valuable data and models, and face a growing threat landscape putting AI/ML assets at risk. Using fundamental cryptographic security techniques performed by a hardware root of trust can safeguard these assets from attack.
For end-to-end security of data and devices, data must be secured both when it as rest (stored on a connected device) and when it is in motion (communicated between connected devices). For data at rest, a hardware root of trust anchored in silicon provides that foundation upon which all device security is built. Similarly, MACsec security anchored in hardware at the foundational communication layer provides that basis of trust for data in motion.
The counterfeit market for semiconductors is real, sizable and growing. Industry analysts peg the current market for fake semiconductors at $75B. Counterfeit chips pose great risk to driver comfort and safety, to say nothing of the severe negative consequences they present to automaker revenues and brand. The good news is there are immediate and cost-effective measures available to secure the semiconductor supply chain and stop counterfeiters in their tracks.
The counterfeit market for semiconductors is real, sizable and growing. The Senate Armed Services Committee found over 1,800 cases where counterfeit electronic components were introduced into U.S. military hardware including airplanes, helicopters and missiles. Counterfeit chips pose serious risk to military equipment and the service personnel who depend on that hardware to perform their mission.
When Jann Horn of Google’s Project Zero posted a detailed blog titled “Reading privileged memory with a side-channel,” it set off a firestorm of activity as the post confirmed that secret information inside a computer could be accessed via two different attacks, Meltdown and Spectre. Essentially, both attacks utilize CPU data cache timing to efficiently exploit and leak information from the system. This could lead to – at worst – arbitrary virtual memory read vulnerabilities across local security boundaries in various contexts.