Dedicated accelerator hardware for artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) algorithms are increasingly prevalent in data centers and endpoint devices. These accelerators handle valuable data and models, and face a growing threat landscape putting AI/ML assets at risk. Using fundamental cryptographic security techniques performed by a hardware root of trust can safeguard these assets from attack.
Security IP
Protecting Safety, Revenue and Brand: Combating Counterfeit Semiconductors in the Automotive Supply Chain
The counterfeit market for semiconductors is real, sizable and growing. Industry analysts peg the current market for fake semiconductors at $75B. Counterfeit chips pose great risk to driver comfort and safety, to say nothing of the severe negative consequences they present to automaker revenues and brand. The good news is there are immediate and cost-effective measures available to secure the semiconductor supply chain and stop counterfeiters in their tracks.
Combating Counterfeit Semiconductors in the Military Supply Chain
The counterfeit market for semiconductors is real, sizable and growing. The Senate Armed Services Committee found over 1,800 cases where counterfeit electronic components were introduced into U.S. military hardware including airplanes, helicopters and missiles. Counterfeit chips pose serious risk to military equipment and the service personnel who depend on that hardware to perform their mission.
Full Disk Encryption of Solid State Drives and Root of Trust
File encryption, file system encryption and full disk encryption (FDE) are methods offered by the industry to allow users to protect their data stored on non-volatile storage devices, such as Solid State Disks (SSD). The main feature of FDE is to protect stored system and user date from unauthorized reading, writing, alteration, moving or rolling back. However, extended security features are key to securing FDE implementation.
Interac: Securing Canada’s Mobile Payments
Protecting Electronic Systems from Side-Channel Attacks
Side-channel attacks conducted against electronic systems are relatively simple and inexpensive to execute. An attacker does not need to know specific implementation details of the cryptographic device to perform these attacks and extract keys. As all physical electronic systems routinely leak information, effective side-channel countermeasures such as Rambus’ DPA Resistant Hardware Cores (DPARC) or DPA Software Library (DPASL) should be implemented at the design stage to ensure protection of sensitive keys and data. After the implementation of hardware or software countermeasures, systems should be carefully evaluated with a Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) platform such as the Rambus DPA Workstation (DPAWS) to confirm the cessation of sensitive side-channel leakage.
